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I. INTRODUCTION 
The criminal law—a beautiful, albeit sometimes ramshackle, institution 
devoted to blaming and punishing culpable agents—has been developing for 
well over half a millennium to help us live together.  It is the product of an 
 
* J.D., Ph.D.  Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology and Law 
in Psychiatry, and Associate Director, Center for Neuroscience & Society, University of Pennsylvania.  
This Article is based on the author’s Barrock Lecture in Criminal Law delivered at Marquette Law 
School in November 2014.  I thank Dean Joseph Kearney, Professors Janine Kim, Matthew Parlow, 
Daniel Blinka, and Michael McChrystal, and all their colleagues for making my visit to Marquette so 
stimulating and pleasant. 
This Article distills, draws on, and extends the work I have been doing on law and neuroscience 
for two decades.  Many of the arguments are familiar, but until there are conceptual or scientific 
breakthroughs—and none is on the horizon—this is my story and I’m sticking to it.   
 I am indebted to the readers and critics, who are too numerous to mention, who have helped me 
refine my positions.  Michael Moore deserves special mention, however, for no one has taught me as 
much.  I also thank Ed Greenlee, as always, for his superb, invaluable help. 
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immense number of judicial decisions and penal statutes, and it has stood the 
test of time as the product of human trial and error.  We common lawyers like 
to think that it is impossible to produce an ex ante watertight criminal code.  As 
is well known, the Model Penal Code, an enterprise produced by the best and 
the brightest, has been subjected to intense criticism, and even states that have 
been heavily influenced by it have made substantial changes.  Instead, common 
lawyers believe that the bottom-up, “organic” methodology of the common-law 
process in interaction with penal codes will ultimately produce reasonably 
coherent and just, but not perfect, criminal law. 
The criminal law is a thoroughly folk-psychological enterprise.1  Doctrine 
and practice implicitly assume that human beings are agents, creatures who act 
intentionally for reasons, who can be guided by reasons, and who in adulthood 
are capable of sufficient rationality to ground full responsibility unless an 
excusing condition obtains.  We all take this “standard picture” for granted 
because it is the foundation not just of law but of interpersonal relations 
generally, including how we explain ourselves to others and to ourselves. 
The law’s concept of the person and responsibility has been under assault 
throughout the modern scientific era, but in the last few decades dazzling 
technological innovations and discoveries in some sciences, especially the new 
neuroscience and to a lesser extent genetics, have put unprecedented pressure 
on the standard picture.  For example, in a 2002 editorial published in The 
Economist, the following warning was given: “Genetics may yet threaten 
privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous and gut the concept of 
human nature.  But neuroscience could do all of these things first.”2  Consider 
the following statement from a widely noticed chapter by neuroscientists 
Joshua Greene of Harvard and Jonathan Cohen of Princeton, which I quote at 
length to give the full flavor of the claim being made: 
[A]s more and more scientific facts come in, providing increasingly 
vivid illustrations of what the human mind is really like, more and more 
people will develop moral intuitions that are at odds with our current 
social practices . . . . 
 Neuroscience has a special role to play in this process for the 
following reason.  As long as the mind remains a black box, there will 
always be a donkey on which to pin dualist and libertarian intuitions. 
. . . What neuroscience does, and will continue to do at an accelerated 
pace, is elucidate the “when”, “where” and “how” of the mechanical 
processes that cause behaviour.  It is one thing to deny that human 
 
1.  I discuss the meaning of folk psychology more thoroughly in Part IV. 
2.  The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 77, 77, 
www.economist.com/node/1143317/print [http://perma.cc/3DKJ-9GAZ]. 
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decision-making is purely mechanical when your opponent offers only 
a general, philosophical argument.  It is quite another to hold your 
ground when your opponent can make detailed predictions about how 
these mechanical processes work, complete with images of the brain 
structures involved and equations that describe their function. 
. . . . 
 At some further point . . . , [p]eople may grow up completely used 
to the idea that every decision is a thoroughly mechanical process, the 
outcome of which is completely determined by the results of prior 
mechanical processes.  What will such people think as they sit in their 
jury boxes? . . . Will jurors of the future wonder whether the 
defendant . . . could have done otherwise?  Whether he really deserves 
to be punished . . . ?  We submit that these questions, which seem so 
important today, will lose their grip in an age when the mechanical 
nature of human decision-making is fully appreciated.  The law will 
continue to punish misdeeds, as it must for practical reasons, but the 
idea of distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty from those who are 
merely victims of neuronal circumstances will, we submit, seem 
pointless.3 
This is not the familiar metaphysical claim that determinism is incompatible 
with responsibility, about which I will say more below.4  It is a far more radical 
claim that denies the conception of personhood and action that underlies not 
only criminal responsibility but the coherence of law as a normative institution.  
It thus completely conflicts with our common sense.  As the eminent 
philosopher of mind and action, Jerry Fodor, has written: 
[W]e have . . . no decisive reason to doubt that very many 
commonsense belief/desire explanations are—literally—true. 
 Which is just as well, because if commonsense intentional 
psychology really were to collapse, that would be, beyond comparison, 
the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species; if 
we’re that wrong about the mind, then that’s the wrongest we’ve ever 
been about anything.  The collapse of the supernatural, for example, 
didn’t compare; theism never came close to being as intimately 
involved in our thought and our practice . . . as belief/desire explanation 
is.  Nothing except, perhaps, our commonsense physics—our intuitive 
commitment to a world of observer-independent, middle-sized 
 
3.  Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 207, 217–18 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). 
4.  See ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL 23-31 (2005) 
(explaining incompatibilism).  I return to the subject in Parts III and V below.  For now, it is sufficient 
to note that there are good answers to this challenge. 
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objects—comes as near our cognitive core as intentional explanation 
does.  We’ll be in deep, deep trouble if we have to give it up. 
 I’m dubious . . . that we can give it up; that our intellects are so 
constituted that doing without it ( . . . really doing without it; not just 
loose philosophical talk) is a biologically viable option.  But be of good 
cheer; everything is going to be all right.5 
The central thesis of this Article is that Fodor is correct and that our 
commonsense understanding of agency and responsibility and the legitimacy 
of criminal justice generally are not imperiled by contemporary discoveries in 
the various sciences, including neuroscience and genetics.  These sciences will 
not revolutionize criminal law, at least not anytime soon, and at most they may 
make modest contributions to legal doctrine, practice, and policy. 
I first address the criminal law’s motivation and the motivation of some 
advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard normative problems that law 
addresses.  The next part discusses how I think the law should respond to the 
metaphysical issues that underpin our concepts of action and responsibility.  
Then the Article considers the law’s psychology and its concepts of the person 
and responsibility.  Next, I describe the general relation of neuroscience to law, 
which I characterize as the issue of “translation.”  The following part canvasses 
various distractions, especially determinism and the notion that causation is per 
se an excusing condition, that have bedeviled clear thinking about the relation 
of scientific, causal accounts of behavior to responsibility.  Next, I examine the 
limits of neurolaw and then consider why neuroscience does not pose a 
genuinely radical challenge to the law’s concepts of the person and 
responsibility.  The penultimate part makes a case for cautious optimism about 
the contribution that neuroscience may make to criminal law in the near and 
intermediate term.  A brief conclusion follows.  Throughout, common sense is 
my guiding star. 
II. NEUROEXUBERANCE 
Advances in neuroimaging since the early 1990s have been the source of 
the exuberance.  Two in particular stand out: the discovery of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which allows noninvasive measurement 
of neural functioning, and the availability of ever-higher-resolution scanners, 
known colloquially as “magnets” because they use powerful magnetic fields to 
collect the data that are ultimately expressed in the colorful brain images that 
appear in the scientific and popular media.  Bedazzled by the technology and 
 
5.  JERRY A. FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
MIND xii (1987). 
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the many impressive findings, however, too many legal scholars and advocates 
have made claims for the relevance of the new neuroscience to law that are 
unsupported by the data6 or that are conceptually confused.7  I have termed this 
tendency “brain overclaim syndrome (BOS)” and have recommended 
“cognitive jurotherapy (CJ)” as the appropriate therapy.8 
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative, addressing how we 
should regulate our lives in a complex society.  How do we live together?  What 
are the duties we owe each other?  For violations of those duties, when is the 
state justified in imposing the most afflictive—but sometimes justified—
exercises of state power, criminal blame, and punishment?9  When should we 
do this, to whom, and how much? 
Virtually every legal issue is contested—consider criminal responsibility, 
for example—and there is always room for debate about policy, doctrine, and 
adjudication.  In a recent book, Professor Robin Feldman has argued that law 
lacks the courage forthrightly to address the difficult normative issues that it 
faces.10  The law therefore adopts what Feldman terms an “internalizing” and 
an “externalizing” strategy for using science to try to avoid the difficulties.11  In 
the internalizing strategy, the law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria.  A 
futuristic example might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility.  In 
the externalizing strategy, the law turns to scientific or clinical experts to make 
the decision.  An example would be using forensic clinicians to decide whether 
a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial and then simply rubberstamping 
the clinician’s opinion.  Neither strategy is successful because each avoids 
facing the hard questions and impedes legal evolution and progress.  Professor 
Feldman concludes, and I agree, that the law does not err by using science too 
little, as is commonly claimed.  Rather, it errs by using it too much, because the 
law is insecure about its resources and capacities to do justice.12 
A fascinating question is why so many enthusiasts seem to have extravagant 
 
6.  Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 13 LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 529 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010). 
7.  See, e.g., MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2013); Michael S. Moore, Libet’s 
Challenge(s) to Responsible Agency, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 207 (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011). 
8.  Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Redux, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509 (2013); Stephen J. Morse, 
Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
397 (2006). 
9.  See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process requires that every 
conviction be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt as to every element of the crime). 
10.  ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009). 
11.  Id. at 19–21, 37–39. 
12.  Id. at 199–200. 
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expectations about the contribution of neuroscience to law, especially criminal 
law.  Here is my speculation about the source.  Many people intensely dislike 
the concept and practice of retributive justice, thinking that they are 
prescientific and harsh.  Their hope is that the new neuroscience will convince 
the law at last that determinism is true, no offender is genuinely responsible, 
and the only logical conclusion is that the law should adopt a consequentially 
based prediction/prevention system of social control guided by the knowledge 
of the neuroscientist-kings who will finally have supplanted the platonic 
philosopher-kings.13  Then, they believe, criminal justice will be kinder, fairer, 
and more rational.  They do not recognize, however, that most of the draconian 
innovations in criminal law that have led to so much incarceration—such as 
recidivist enhancements, mandatory minimum sentences, and the crack/powder 
cocaine sentencing disparities—were all driven by consequential concerns for 
deterrence and incapacitation.  Moreover, as C.S. Lewis recognized long ago, 
such a scheme is disrespectful and dehumanizing.14  Finally, there is nothing 
inherently harsh about retributivism.  It is a theory of justice that may be applied 
toughly or tenderly. 
On a more modest level, many advocates think that neuroscience may not 
revolutionize criminal justice, but neuroscience will demonstrate that many 
more offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh punishments 
imposed by the United States criminal justice system.  Four decades ago, our 
criminal justice system would have been using psychodynamic psychology for 
the same purpose.  More recently, genetics has been employed in a similar 
manner.  The impulse, however, is clear: jettison desert, or at least mitigate, 
judgments of desert.  As will be shown below, however, these advocates often 
adopt an untenable theory of mitigation or an excuse that quickly collapses into 
the nihilistic conclusion that no one is really criminally responsible. 
III. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND SPOCKIAN METHODOLOGY 
One is always “doing” metaphysics whether or not one is aware of it.  About 
some legal issues, it scarcely matters, but about the types of issues that the new 
sciences address, such as the causation of action (the mind-body problem) and 
the criteria for responsibility (compatibilism vs. incompatibilism), 
metaphysical assumptions matter.  The question is whether one must resolve or 
even defend one’s metaphysical and other philosophical foundations in these 
fraught areas.  I think not.  I make no claim for metaphysical or philosophical 
quietism because I believe that metaphysical questions are conceptually and 
 
13.  Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, are exemplars of this type of thinking.  I will discuss the 
normative inertness of this position in Part VIII. 
14.  C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224 (1953). 
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practically important in many cases.15  I shall suggest, however, that, when 
philosophy is foundational and practically important, one’s position must be 
acknowledged but need not be defended or, a fortiori, resolved. 
Please do the following thought experiment.  Imagine that you do a content 
analysis of high-level introductory texts in metaphysics or in any other area in 
philosophy, such as the philosophy of mind and action.  The intrepid 
investigator will find, without exception, that each text will describe many 
different, often contradictory, approaches to the central questions.  What is the 
relation of the potential truth of determinism to the possibility of “free will” and 
responsibility?  Every text will discuss libertarianism, hard determinism, and 
compatibilism.  Are there moral truths independent of our constructs and 
practices?  Every text will discuss varieties of realism, antirealism, and 
everything in between.  What is the relation of the brain to consciousness, mind, 
and action?  Every text will present various forms of physicalism and the like.  
There will almost always be good arguments for and against the various 
positions, but none will have clearly dominated, although some, such as 
substance dualism, will be included largely for historical reasons.  Moreover, it 
is a science fiction fantasy to believe that science will resolve the most 
fundamental problems that might in principle admit of empirical solutions, at 
least in the lifetimes of the readers of this Article.  Consequently, all the 
contenders will be left standing.  To paraphrase the noted metaphysician, Lewis 
Carroll, everyone has won (at least in his or her own eyes) and all must have 
prizes. 
What is a poor, country lawyer-scholar supposed to do in such 
circumstances when trying to make normative arguments about doctrine, 
practice, and policy?  One possibility is to master all the metaphysical 
arguments relevant to the question being addressed, take a position, and try to 
defend it against the counterarguments.  This seems like a bootless enterprise, 
however, if one’s training is not in metaphysics and if one is primarily 
interested in doctrine, practice, and policy.  Arguing metaphysics, or other basic 
philosophical issues, is not the country lawyer-scholar’s comparative 
advantage, and it will not lead to an uncontroversial position, even if one were 
to achieve sufficient mastery.  Further, the history of the law suggests that 
country lawyers can “run the railroad” without even recognizing the 
foundational issues that are implicated.  If philosophical understanding is not 
the goal, it is in large measure a distraction.  So the original question remains: 
How should one proceed? 
My current preferred approach is what I call “Spockian solutions,” or what 
 
15.  See generally Charles L. Barzun, Metaphysical Quietism and Functional Explanation in the 
Law, 34 LAW & PHIL. 89 (2015) (arguing for metaphysical engagement). 
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to do until the doctors of metaphysics and science arrive to cure our 
metaphysical and empirical ills.  By Spockian I do not mean the cold-bloodedly, 
rational Vulcan, Dr. Spock, of Star Trek fame.  I refer to the even more famous 
pediatrician and author, Dr. Benjamin M. Spock (1903–1998), whose many 
editions of the influential child care manual, Baby and Child Care, guided 
parents over the shoals of child-rearing for many generations.16  At a time when 
it was more difficult to obtain medical attention for one’s sick child, the book 
was replete with formulas for ameliorating the problem—be it fever, diarrhea, 
or any other of the common ills that beset children17—until the doctor came 
(doctors made house calls in the past) or until the parents and child could make 
it to the doctor. 
In the spirit of Dr. Spock, my legal home remedy is to start with a normative 
position that is attractive at the non-metaphysical level of applied ethical, moral, 
political, and legal theory.  If this position is consistent with a reasonable 
metaphysics that does not conflict with relatively uncontroversial, or at least 
plausible, empirical accounts about the world and with other reasonable 
philosophical theories, then one can proceed without defending the 
metaphysics, the empirics, and the other philosophical positions.  Common 
sense should enter the analysis, too.  Any position that violates common sense 
should meet the most demanding burden of persuasion.  Once one’s 
foundational position is adopted, however, the scholar does have the duty to 
avoid adopting normative positions that require inconsistent metaphysical or 
other foundational positions unless there is good reason why different 
metaphysics or foundations may be appropriate for different contexts. 
This home remedy is intellectually defensible.  A plausible basic position 
must be taken, which requires reasonable understanding.  A critic might point 
out all the reasons that the chosen metaphysics or other philosophical 
foundation is questionable and, therefore, that the normative position adopted 
might seem unjustified.  But a sophisticated metaphysician who adheres to the 
chosen metaphysics would have answers, and there would be no decisive 
arguments to refute the sophisticate.  Trying to defend a metaphysics at the level 
of professional philosophy involves too much “inside baseball” analysis when 
one is trying to accomplish something else. 
Now let me turn to examples of the home remedy that are relevant to the 
other topics this Article addresses.  The basic questions that run through most 
are the relation of the brain (or body, or matter) to mind and action and the 
 
16.  BENJAMIN SPOCK, BABY AND CHILD CARE (4th ed. 1976).  I cite an earlier edition because 
the following examples are drawn from it.  The book is now in its ninth edition (with Robert 
Needlman). 
17. Id. at 235-37 (diarrhea), 501-02 (high fever). 
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implications of the truth of determinism.  I am a physicalist about the former.  
The brain enables the mind and action, but we have no idea how, despite all the 
astonishing advances in neuroscience and other disciplines.18  Indeed, the 
problem of consciousness may be insoluble,19 although perhaps progress can be 
made on mental states and actions.  How do we know that the brain enables the 
mind and action?  Well, if your brain is dead, you are dead, and to the best of 
our knowledge, you have no mental states and aren’t doing much at all 
(although your heart and lungs may still be working if your brain stem is still 
alive). 
Assuming that the brain does enable the mind and action, is the relation 
reductive or not?  Is property dualism true?  Can mental states cause changes 
in physical states, or does the exclusion principle require that causation can only 
run from the physical to the mental?  At present, nonreductive physicalism is 
probably the dominant view, but neither I nor anyone else can decisively answer 
the foregoing and similar questions. 
I subscribe to the causal theory of action (CTA), of which there are many 
forms and many criticisms.20  CTA roughly holds that an event (behavioral or 
mental) is an action if it is caused in the right way by mental states.  I am happy 
to adopt any version of CTA that accords with common sense and the folk-
psychological theory that we always use to explain ourselves to ourselves and 
to others.21  Moreover, there is a plausible philosophical argument that 
causation can run from the mental to the physical despite the exclusion 
principle.22  I am not suggesting anything mysterious or any form of sui generis 
agent-causation.  In principle, how action happens will be explicable according 
to whatever scientific laws governing the rest of the universe might be 
discovered.  The task of neuroscience should be to explain agency, not to 
explain it away reductively. 
So there is good foundational reason to adopt the CTA and to continue to 
 
18.  PAUL R. MCHUGH & PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 11–12 (2d 
ed. 1998); Ralph Adolphs, The Unsolved Problems of Neuroscience, 19 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 
173,175 (2015). 
19.  See, e.g., COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL 
WORLD (1999). 
20.  Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff, The Causal Theory of Action: Origins and Issues, 
in CAUSING HUMAN ACTIONS 1 (Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff eds., 2010) (providing a 
useful overview).  The volume contains many excellent chapters addressing the issues in more detail. 
21.  In this respect, I am particularly attracted to Michael Moore’s recently revised account.  
Michael S. Moore, Renewed Questions About the Causal Theory of Action, in CAUSING HUMAN 
ACTIONS, supra note 20, at 27.  See generally JOHN HYMAN, ACTION, KNOWLEDGE, AND WILL (2015) 
(providing a fascinating account of the current state of the philosophy of action and a surely 
controversial theory of its own). 
22.  Christian List & Peter Menzies, Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion 
Principle, 106 J. PHIL. 475 (2009). 
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hold that we are agents who can act for, and be guided by, reasons and whose 
most habitual or thoughtless behavior can be brought under the control of 
reason if the person has reason to do so. 
On the foundational question of whether mental states can be reduced to 
brain or other physical states, I am most attracted to nonreductive physicalism.  
We have a mind/brain, which is only one substance, but it has both physical 
and mental properties.  The latter are emergent and cannot be reduced fully to 
the former.  This appears the most commonsensical view, and there is no 
scientific reason to doubt it at present.  The greatest experts cannot resolve this 
issue; no more can a poor, country lawyer-scholar.  Luckily I do not have to.  It 
is sufficient that there are plausible, philosophical accounts that are consistent 
with CTA and folk-psychological explanations.  I am perfectly content 
opportunistically to adopt any of them. 
I am thoroughly a compatibilist on the metaphysical question of whether 
genuine responsibility is possible in a deterministic (or something quite like 
that) universe.  This is the generic view, expressed in many forms by different 
theorists,23 that although no one has libertarian free will—the ability to act 
uncaused by anything but oneself—genuine responsibility is possible even in a 
determinist universe.  Agents must simply have the capacity to determine their 
actions by reasons and to act in light of those reasons and are not compelled to 
act in the ordinary meaning of compulsion (say, a gun to the head).  The God-
like power of libertarian or contra-causal freedom is not necessary for 
responsibility on this earth.  As is argued below, nothing in current 
neuroscience suggests that people do not have these capacities,24 and it is clear 
that most people most of the time are not compelled in the ordinary sense when 
they act. 
Compatibilism is almost certainly the dominant view among professional 
philosophers,25 but it is of course controversial and a metaphysical question that 
science cannot resolve.  Many people probably intuitively believe that we have 
 
23.  See, e.g., John Martin Fischer, Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semicompatibilism: New 
Work, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 243 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011); Michael 
McKenna, Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 175; Paul Russell, Moral Sense and the Foundations of 
Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 199; Christopher Taylor & Daniel 
Dennett, Who’s Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 221. 
24.  See infra Part VIII. 
25.  David Bourget & David J. Chalmers, What Do Philosophers Believe?, 170 PHIL. STUD. 465, 
476 (2014) (reporting the results of a 2009 survey of professional philosophers that showed that a 
majority are either compatibilists or tend towards compatibilism); The 
PhilPapers Surveys: Preliminary Survey Results, PHILPAPERS, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl 
[http://perma.cc/DS94-5RUW] (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
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libertarian free will, and certainly that belief is consistent with criminal law 
doctrine.  This position is extremely implausible in the modern scientific age, 
however.  Human beings, as complex as they are, are still part of the physical 
universe and subject to the same laws that govern all phenomena.  I will return 
to the consistency of determinism with doctrines of criminal responsibility 
below,26 but for now it is sufficient to note that compatibilism is also consistent 
with all criminal law doctrines and mostly accords with common sense in the 
modern scientific era.  It is a perfectly good home remedy. 
I take no position on the vexed question of whether anyone can do otherwise 
even if the CTA is true.  There is dispute about how the principle of alternative 
possibilities should be interpreted, and, like Jay Wallace,27 I very much doubt 
that foundational questions of responsibility will be decided by precious 
deployment of modal logic.  There are sufficient, extant arguments to suggest 
that the principle of alternative possibilities is not a problem.28  They are 
controversial, but this question will not be solved to everyone’s satisfaction, 
and we have a railroad to run.  I am a compatibilist, a perfectly plausible 
metaphysics, and will continue to believe that robust responsibility is possible 
until an incontrovertible argument that all would accept requires me to jettison 
this view. 
In short, CTA and compatibilism are my bedrock metaphysics.  If anyone 
else wishes to claim that I need a particular type of CTA theory or 
compatibilism, I am happy to take that as a friendly amendment.  Giving up 
CTA or compatibilism would undermine my work in general and the arguments 
of this Article in particular, but happily, nothing in philosophy or science 
suggests that I must do so for now. 
IV. THE LAW’S PSYCHOLOGY, CONCEPT OF THE PERSON, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Criminal law presupposes a “folk psychological” view of the person and 
behavior.29  This psychological theory causally explains behavior in part by 
mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans.30  
 
26.  See infra Part V. 
27.  R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 202, 251–65 (1994). 
28.  See, e.g., KADRI VIHVELIN, CAUSES, LAWS, AND FREE WILL: WHY DETERMINISM DOESN’T 
MATTER (2013). 
29.  Katrina L. Sifferd, In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law, 
25 LAW & PHIL. 571, 571 (2006). 
30.  This meaning of folk psychology as a casual explanatory theory of action must be 
distinguished from the usage of the term to refer to bits of folk wisdom about the content of those 
mental states.  For example, folk wisdom is that adolescents are more impulsive than adults.  Any of 
the latter might be disconfirmed by empirical evidence, but the former can be disconfirmed only if the 
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Biological and other psychological and sociological variables also play a causal 
role, and a complete explanation would involve variables from all levels of all 
these fields.31  But folk psychology considers mental states fundamental to a 
full causal explanation and understanding of human action.  Lawyers, 
philosophers, and scientists argue about the definitions of mental states and 
theories of action, but that does not undermine the general claim that mental 
states are fundamental.  The arguments and evidence that disputants use to 
convince others presuppose the folk-psychological view of the person.  Brains 
do not convince each other, people do.  Folk psychology presupposes only that 
human action will at least be rationalizable by mental state explanations or will 
be responsive to reasons—including incentives—under the right conditions. 
For example, the folk-psychological explanation for why you are reading 
this Article is roughly that you desire to understand the relation of neuroscience 
to criminal responsibility; you believe that reading the Article will help fulfill that 
desire.  As a result of your desire and belief, you formed the intention to read it.  
This is a practical, rather than a deductive, syllogism. 
Brief reflection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a folk-
psychological theory, a view of the person as a conscious—and potentially self-
conscious—creature who forms and acts on intentions that are the product of the 
person’s other mental states.  We are the sort of creatures who can act for, and 
respond to, reasons.  The law treats persons generally as intentional creatures and 
not simply as mechanistic forces of nature. 
Law is primarily action-guiding and is not able to guide people directly and 
indirectly unless people are capable of using rules as premises in their reasoning 
about how they should behave.  Unless people could be guided by law, it would 
be useless (and perhaps incoherent) as an action-guiding system of rules.32  Legal 
 
radical critique is demonstrated to be true.  See infra Part VIII for a discussion of this possibility. 
31.  This is known as a multifield, multilevel mode of explanation.  See CARL F. CRAVER, 
EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC UNITY OF NEUROSCIENCE (2007). 
32.  See GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 123 (2006) (stating that although philosophers 
disagree about the requirements and justifications of what morality requires, there is widespread 
agreement that “the primary task of morality is to guide action”); Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality, and 
the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127, 131–32 (2000); John R. Searle, End of the Revolution, 
49 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, at 33, 35 (2002). 
This view assumes that law is sufficiently knowable to guide conduct, but a contrary assumption 
is largely incoherent.  As Shapiro writes: 
 Legal skepticism is an absurd doctrine.  It is absurd because the law cannot be the sort 
of thing that is unknowable.  If a system of norms were unknowable, then that system would 
not be a legal system.  One important reason why the law must be knowable is that its 
function is to guide conduct. 
Shapiro, supra, at 131.  I do not assume that legal rules are always clear and thus capable of precise 
action guidance.  If most rules in a legal system were not sufficiently clear most of the time, however, 
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rules are action-guiding primarily because these rules provide an agent with good 
moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or action.  Human behavior can be 
modified by means other than influencing deliberation, and human beings do not 
always deliberate before they act.  Nonetheless, the law presupposes folk 
psychology, even when we most habitually follow the legal rules.  Unless people 
are capable of understanding and then using legal rules to guide their conduct, the 
law is powerless to affect human behavior. 
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must always reason or 
consistently behave rationally according to some preordained, normative notion 
of rationality.  Rather, the law’s view is that people are capable of minimal 
rationality according to predominantly conventional, socially constructed 
standards.  The type of rationality the law requires is the ordinary person’s 
commonsense view of rationality, not the technical notion that might be 
acceptable within the disciplines of economics, philosophy, psychology, 
computer science, and the like.  Rationality is a congeries of abilities, including 
inter alia getting the facts straight, having a relatively coherent preference-
ordering, understanding what variables are relevant to action, and the ability to 
understand how to achieve the goals one has (instrumental rationality).  How 
these abilities should be interpreted and how much of them are necessary for 
responsibility may be debated, but the debate is about rationality. 
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed, 
rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causation and, in principle, is 
responsive to reasons, including incentives.  Machines may cause harm, but they 
cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate expectations about how people ought 
to live together.  Machines do not deserve praise, blame, reward, punishment, 
concern, or respect because they exist or as a consequence of the results they 
cause.  Only people, intentional agents with the potential to act, can do wrong 
and violate expectations of what they owe each other. 
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action might consider 
folk psychology to be a primitive or prescientific view of human behavior.  For 
the foreseeable future, however, the law will be based on the folk-psychological 
model of the person and behavior described.  Until and unless scientific 
discoveries convince us that our view of ourselves is radically wrong, the basic 
explanatory apparatus of folk psychology will remain central.  It is vital that we 
not lose sight of this model lest we fall into confusion when various claims based 
on neuroscience or other sciences are made.  If any science is to have appropriate 
influence on current criminal law and legal decision making, the science must be 
relevant to and translated into the law’s folk-psychological framework. 
 
the system could not function.  Further, the principle of legality dictates that criminal law rules should 
be especially clear. 
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All of the criminal law’s doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility are folk 
psychological.  Begin with the definitional criteria, the “elements” of crime.  The 
“voluntary” act requirement is defined, roughly, as an intentional bodily 
movement—or omission in cases in which the person has a duty to act—done in 
a reasonably integrated state of consciousness.  Other than crimes of strict 
liability, all crimes also require a culpable mental state, such as purpose, 
knowledge, or recklessness.  All affirmative defenses of justification and excuse 
involve an inquiry into the person’s mental state, such as the belief that self-
defensive force was necessary or the lack of knowledge of right from wrong.  
Our folk-psychological concepts of criminal responsibility follow logically 
from the action-guiding nature of law itself, from its folk-psychological concept 
of the person and action, and from the aims of achieving retributive justice, which 
holds that no one should be punished unless he deserves it and no more than he 
deserves, and the maximization of social safety.  The general capacity for 
rationality is the primary condition for responsibility, and the lack of that capacity 
is the primary condition for excusing a person.  If human beings were not rational 
creatures who could understand the good reasons for action and were not capable 
of conforming to legal requirements through intentional action or forbearance, 
the law could not adequately guide action and would not be just.  Legally 
responsible agents are therefore people who have the general capacity to grasp 
and be guided by good reason in particular legal contexts.33 
In cases of excuse, the agent who has done something wrong acts for a reason 
but is either incapable of rationality generally or incapable on the specific 
occasion in question.  This explains, for example, why young children and some 
people with mental disorders are not held responsible.  The amount of lack of 
capacity for rationality that is necessary to find the agent not responsible is a 
moral, social, political, and, ultimately, a legal issue.  It is not a scientific, medical, 
psychological, or psychiatric issue. 
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition.  Literal compulsion 
exists when the person’s bodily movement is a pure mechanism that is not 
rationalizable by reference to the agent’s mental states.  These cases defeat the 
requirement of a “voluntary act.”  For example, a tremor or spasm produced by a 
neurological disorder is not an action because it is not intentional and, therefore, 
defeats the ascription of a voluntary act.  Metaphorical compulsion exists when 
an agent acts intentionally but in response to some hard choice imposed on the 
agent through no fault of his or her own.  For example, if a miscreant holds a gun 
to an agent’s head and threatens to kill her unless she kills another innocent 
person, it would be wrong to kill under these circumstances.  Nevertheless, the 
 
33.  I adapt the felicitous phrase “to grasp and be guided by good reason” from WALLACE, supra 
note 27, at 86. 
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law may decide as a normative matter to excuse the act of intentional killing 
because the agent was motivated by a threat so great that it would be supremely 
difficult for most citizens to resist.34 
Cases involving internal compulsive states are more difficult to conceptualize 
because it is difficult to define and assess “loss of control.”35  The cases that most 
fit this category are “disorders of desire,” such as addictions and sexual disorders.  
The question is why these acting agents lack control but other people with strong 
desires do not.  If people frequently yield to their apparently very strong desires 
at great social, medical, occupational, financial, and legal cost to themselves, 
agents will often say they could not help themselves, they were not in control, 
and an excuse or mitigation is therefore warranted.  But why mitigation or excuse 
should obtain is difficult to understand. 
V. DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING NEUROSCIENCE AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
This part considers a number of related issues that are often thought to be 
relevant to criminal responsibility and competence but that are in fact irrelevant, 
confusing, and distracting: free will, causation as an excuse, causation as 
compulsion, prediction as an excuse, dualism, and the non-efficacy of mental 
states, many of which have already been touched upon.  It is important to correct 
these errors because much of the unjustified legal exuberance about the 
contributions of neuroscience to criminal law flows from them.  The legal 
exuberance also flows, however, from unrealistic expectations about the 
scientific accomplishments of neuroscience.  A later part of this Article addresses 
the scientific exuberance. 
Contrary to what many people believe, and what judges and others sometimes 
say, free will is not a legal criterion that is part of any doctrine, and it is not even 
foundational for criminal responsibility.36  As Part III noted when adopting a 
compatibilist metaphysics about responsibility, criminal law doctrines are fully 
consistent with the truth of determinism or universal causation that allegedly 
undermines the foundations of responsibility.  Even if determinism is true, some 
people act and some people do not.  Some people form prohibited mental states, 
and some do not.  Some people are legally insane or act under duress when they 
 
34.  I recognize that the common law and most state codes do not permit a duress excuse when 
innocent life is taken.  In contrast, section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code would permit the excuse in 
appropriate cases, and this example makes the point most clearly without confusing duress/necessity 
as a justification and duress as an excuse. 
35.  Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1035 
(2002);see Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423–24 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36.  Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 
25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 203, 207 (2007). 
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commit crimes, but most defendants are not legally insane or acting under duress.  
Moreover, these distinctions matter to moral and legal theories of responsibility 
and fairness that we have reason to endorse.  Criminal law addresses problems 
genuinely related to responsibility, including consciousness, the formation of 
mental states such as intention and knowledge, the capacity for rationality, and 
compulsion.  The law, however, never addresses the presence or absence of free 
will.  
When most people use the term “free will” in the context of legal 
responsibility, they are typically using it loosely as a synonym for the conclusion 
that the defendant was or was not criminally responsible.  They typically have 
reached this conclusion for reasons that do not involve free will understood as 
contra-causal freedom—for example, that the defendant was legally insane or 
acted under duress—but such use of the term, “free will,” only perpetuates 
misunderstanding and confusion.  Once the legal criteria for excuse have been 
met—and no excuse includes lack of free will as a criterion—the defendant will 
be excused without any reference whatsoever to free will as an independent 
ground for excuse. 
There is a genuine metaphysical problem regarding free will, which is 
whether human beings have the capacity to act uncaused by anything other than 
themselves and whether this capacity is a necessary foundation for holding 
anyone legally or morally accountable for criminal conduct.  Philosophers and 
others have debated these issues in various forms for millennia, and there is no 
resolution in sight.  Indeed, some people might think that the problem is insoluble.  
This is a philosophical issue, but it is not a problem for the law, and neuroscience 
raises no new challenge to this conclusion.  Solving the free will problem would 
have profound implications for responsibility doctrines and practices, such as 
blame and punishment, but having or lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion 
of any civil or criminal law doctrine. 
Neuroscience is simply the most recent, mechanistic causal science that 
appears deterministically to explain behavior.  Neuroscience thus joins social 
structural variables, behaviorism, genetics, and other scientific explanations that 
have also been deterministic explanations for behavior.  In principle, however, 
neuroscience adds nothing new, even if neuroscience is a better, more persuasive 
science than some of its predecessors.  No science, including neuroscience, can 
demonstrate that libertarian free will does or does not exist.  As long as free will 
in the strong sense is not foundational for just blame and punishment and is not a 
criterion at the doctrinal level, the truth of determinism or universal causation 
poses no threat to legal responsibility.  Neuroscience may help shed light on folk-
psychological excusing conditions, such as automatism or legal insanity, but the 
truth of determinism is not an excusing condition.  The law will be fundamentally 
challenged only if neuroscience, or any other science, can conclusively 
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demonstrate that the law’s psychology is wrong and that we are not the type of 
creatures for whom mental states are causally effective.  This is a different 
question from whether determinism undermines responsibility, however, and this 
Article returns to it below. 
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is caused, but causation 
per se is not a legal or moral mitigating or excusing condition.  I termed this 
confusion the “fundamental psycholegal error.”37  At most, causal explanations 
can only provide evidence concerning whether a genuine excusing condition, 
such as lack of rational capacity, was present.  Brain causation—or any other kind 
of causation—does not mean that we are automatons, not really acting agents at 
all, or otherwise excused.  Even a genuinely abnormal cause is not per se an 
excusing condition.  For example, imagine an armed robber who suffers from 
intermittent hypomania and who only robs when he is clinically hypomanic 
because only then does he feel sufficiently energetic and confident.  In other 
words, the hypomania is a “but for” cause of his robberies.  Nevertheless, he 
would not be excused for an armed robbery because hypomania seldom 
compromises rational capacity sufficiently to warrant an excuse.  If he committed 
an armed robbery under the influence of a delusional belief his mania produced, 
then he might be excused by reason of legal insanity.  In that case, the excusing 
condition would be compromised rationality and not the mania per se.  In short, 
a neuroscientific causal explanation for criminal conduct, like any other type of 
causal explanation, does not per se mitigate or excuse.  It only provides evidence 
that might help the law resolve whether a genuine excuse existed, or it may in the 
future provide data that might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative 
measures. 
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufficient causal conditions 
without which the behavior would not have occurred, including brain causation, 
which is always part of the causal explanation for any behavior.  If causation were 
an excusing condition per se, then no one would be responsible for any behavior.  
Some people might welcome such a conclusion and believe that responsibility is 
impossible, but this is not the legal and moral world we inhabit.  The law holds 
most adults responsible for most of their conduct, and genuine excusing 
conditions are limited.  Unless the person’s history or mental condition, for 
example, provides evidence of an existing excusing or mitigating condition, such 
as lack of rational capacity, there is no reason for excuse or mitigation. 
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition, but causation—
including brain causation—is not the equivalent of compulsion.  Part IV showed 
that compulsion may be either literal or metaphorical and normative.  It is crucial 
to recognize that most human action is not plausibly the result of either type of 
 
37.  Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592–94 (1994). 
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compulsion, but all human behavior is caused by its necessary and sufficient 
causes—including brain causation.  Even abnormal causes are not necessarily 
compelling.  To illustrate, suppose that a person has weak pedophilic urges and 
weak sexual urges in general.  If this person molested a child, there would be no 
ground for a compulsion excuse.  If causation were the equivalent of compulsion, 
all behavior would be compelled and no one would be responsible.  Once again, 
this is not a plausible account of the law’s responsibility conditions.  Causal 
information from neuroscience might help us resolve questions concerning 
whether legal compulsion existed, or it might be a guide to prophylactic or 
rehabilitative measures when dealing with plausible legal compulsion.  
Causation, however, is not per se compulsion. 
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other science, can 
enhance the accuracy of behavioral predictions, but predictability is also not a per 
se excusing or mitigating condition, even if the predictability of the behavior is 
perfect.  To understand this, consider how many things we do that are perfectly 
predictable but for which there is no plausible excusing or mitigating condition.  
If the variables that enhance prediction also produce a genuine excusing or 
mitigating condition, then excuse or mitigation is justified for the latter reason 
and independent of the prediction. 
For example, recent research demonstrates that a history of childhood abuse 
coupled with a specific, genetically produced enzyme abnormality that produces 
a neurotransmitter deficit increases the risk that a person will behave antisocially 
as an adolescent or young adult.38  Does this mean that an offender with this gene 
by environment interaction is not responsible or less responsible?  No.  The 
offender may not be fully responsible or responsible at all but not because there 
is a causal explanation.  What is the intermediary excusing or mitigating 
principle?  Are these people, for instance, more impulsive?  Are they lacking 
rationality?  What is the actual excusing or mitigating condition? 
Most informed people are not “dualists” concerning the relation between the 
mind and the brain.  That is, they no longer think that our minds (or “souls”) are 
independent of our brains and bodies more generally and can somehow exert a 
causal influence over our bodies.  It may seem as if the law’s emphasis on the 
importance of mental states as causing behavior is based on a prescientific, 
outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the case.  Although the brain enables 
the mind, we have no idea how this occurs and have no idea how action is 
possible.39  It is clear that, at the least, mental states are dependent upon or 
supervene on brain states, but neither neuroscience nor any other science has 
 
38.  See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated 
Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002).  Indeed, the risk is nine times higher. 
39.  See MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 18, at 11–12; Adolphs, supra note 18, at 175. 
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demonstrated that mental states do not play an independent and partial causal 
role. 
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action relation, the 
Introduction to this Article showed that some scientists question whether mental 
states have any causal effect, thus treating mental states as psychic appendixes 
that evolution has created but that have no genuine function.  These claims are 
not strawpersons.  They are made by serious, thoughtful people.40  As discussed 
in Part VIII below, if accepted, they would create a complete and revolutionary 
paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility and more widely.  
In conclusion, legal actors concerned with criminal law policy, doctrine, and 
adjudication must always keep the folk-psychological view present in their minds 
when considering claims or evidence from neuroscience and must always 
question how the science is legally relevant to the law’s action and mental-states 
criteria.  The truth of determinism, causation, and predictability do not in 
themselves answer any doctrinal or policy issue. 
VI. LOST IN TRANSLATION? LEGAL RELEVANCE AND THE NEED FOR 
TRANSLATION 
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to the criminal 
law’s responsibility doctrines canvassed in Part IV?  We must begin with a 
distinction between internal relevance and external relevance.  An internal 
contribution or critique accepts the general coherence and legitimacy of a set of 
legal doctrines, practices, or institutions and attempts to explain or alter them.  
For example, an internal contribution to criminal responsibility may suggest the 
need for doctrinal reform of, say, the insanity defense, but it would not suggest 
that the notion of criminal responsibility is itself incoherent or illegitimate.  By 
contrast, an externally relevant critique suggests that the doctrines, practices, or 
institutions are incoherent, illegitimate, or unjustified.  Because a radical, 
external critique has little possibility of success at present (as is explained 
below), I make the simplifying assumption that the contributions of 
neuroscience will be internal and thus will need to be translated into the law’s 
folk-psychological concepts. 
The law’s criteria for responsibility and competence are essentially 
behavioral—acts and mental states.  The criteria of neuroscience are 
mechanistic—neural structure and function.  Is the apparent chasm between those 
two types of discourse bridgeable?  This is a familiar question in the field of law 
and mental health,41 but there is even greater dissonance in law and neuroscience.  
Psychiatry and psychology sometimes treat behavior mechanistically, sometimes 
 
40.  See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 219. 
41.  See, e.g., ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 95–96 (1984).  
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treat it folk psychologically, and sometimes blend the two.  Consider depression, 
which may be understood both biologically and psychologically.  Even the most 
biologically oriented psychiatrist treating a depressed patient with antidepressant 
medication will also inquire about the course of the patient’s life (if the 
psychiatrist is competent).  In many cases, the psychological sciences are quite 
close to folk psychology in approach.  Neuroscience, in contrast, is purely 
mechanistic and eschews folk-psychological concepts and discourse.  Neurons, 
neural networks, and the connectome do not act intentionally for reasons.  They 
have no sense of past, present, or future and no aspirations.  They do not recognize 
that they will die.  Thus, the gap will be harder to bridge for neuroscience than 
for psychiatry and psychology. 
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know how this occurs).  
Therefore, facts we learn about brains in general, or about a specific brain, could 
in principle provide useful information about mental states and about human 
capacities in general and in specific cases.  Some believe that this conclusion is a 
category error.42  This is a plausible view, and perhaps it is correct.  If it is, then 
the whole subject of the relation of neuroscience to law is mostly empty.  Let us, 
therefore, bracket this pessimistic view and determine what follows from the 
more optimistic position that what we learn about the brain and nervous system 
can be potentially helpful to resolving questions of criminal responsibility if the 
findings are properly translated into the law’s psychological framework. 
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally relevant because it 
makes a proposition about responsibility more or less likely to be true.  Any legal 
criterion must be established independently, and biological evidence must be 
translated into the criminal law’s folk-psychological behavioral criteria.  That is, 
the expert must be able to explain precisely how the neuroevidence bears on 
whether the agent acted, formed the required mens rea, or met the criteria for an 
excusing condition.  If the evidence is not directly relevant, the expert should be 
able to explain the chain of inference from the indirect evidence to the law’s 
criteria.  No hand-waving should be permitted by allowing the expert or scholar 
to move directly from indirect evidence to a legal conclusion.  The chain of 
reasoning should be clear and plausible.  At present, as I explain in the next part, 
few such data exist, but neuroscience is advancing so rapidly that such data may 
exist in the near or medium term.  Moreover, the argument is conceptual and does 
not depend on any particular neuroscience findings. 
The problem of translation is going to be fearsomely hard.  As the next part 
indicates, present neuroscience is not likely to help us with the marginal legal 
 
42.  See, e.g., MAX R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
NEUROSCIENCE 112, 270, 360, 381 (2003).  PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 135, also share 
much of this caution. 
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cases, even if the translation problem is solved in an individual case.  For the most 
part, we will have to rely on careful behavioral investigation and plenty of 
common sense. 
VII. THE PRESENT LIMITS OF NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one of the hardest 
problems in all science.  Once again, we have no idea how the brain enables the 
mind or how action is possible.43  The brain-mind-action relation is a mystery not 
because it is inherently not subject to scientific explanation, but because the 
problem is so hard.  For example, we would like to know the difference between 
a neuromuscular spasm and intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly the same 
way.  The former is a purely mechanical motion, whereas the latter is an action, 
but we cannot explain the difference between the two.  The philosopher, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, famously asked: “Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my 
arm goes up.  And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that 
my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”44  We know that a functioning 
brain is a necessary condition for having mental states and for acting.  After all, 
if your brain is dead, you have no mental states and are not acting.  Still, we do 
not know how mental states and action are caused. 
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other neuroscientific 
methods, we still do not have sophisticated causal knowledge of how the brain 
works generally, and we have little information that is legally relevant.  The 
scientific problems are fearsomely difficult.  Only in the present century have 
researchers begun to accumulate much data from fMRI imaging, which is the 
technology that has generated most of the legal interest.  New artifacts are 
constantly being discovered.45  Moreover, virtually no studies have been 
performed to address specifically legal questions.  The criminal justice system 
should not expect too much of a young science that uses new technologies to 
investigate some of the most dreadfully difficult problems in science and that 
 
43.  See MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 18, at 11–12; Adolphs, supra note 18, at 175. 
44.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 621 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1953) (1953). 
45.  E.g., Craig M. Bennett et al., The Principled Control of False Positives in Neuroimaging, 4 
SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 417 (2009) (indicating that a high percentage of 
previous fMRI studies did not properly control for false positives by controlling for what is called 
“multiple comparisons”).  This problem was termed by one group of authors “voodoo correlations,” 
but they toned back the claim to more scientifically respectable language.  Edward Vul et al., Puzzlingly 
High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition, 4 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 274 (2009).  Needless to say, there was pushback against such criticisms.  See, e.g., 
Matthew D. Lieberman et al., Correlations in Social Neuroscience Aren’t Voodoo: A Commentary on 
Vul et al. (2009), 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 299 (2009).  As any old country lawyer knows, when a 
stone is thrown into a pack of dogs, the one that gets hit yelps. 
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does not directly address questions of legal interest. 
Before turning to the specific reasons for neuromodesty, a few preliminary 
points of general applicability must be addressed.  The first and most important 
is contained in the message of Part V.  Causation by biological variables, 
including abnormal biological variables, does not per se create an excusing or 
mitigating condition.  Any excusing condition must be established independently.  
The goal is always to translate the biological evidence into the criminal law’s 
folk-psychological criteria.  Assessing criminal responsibility involves a 
retrospective evaluation of the defendant’s mental states at the time of the crime.  
No criminal wears a portable scanner or other neurodetection device that provides 
a measurement at the time of the crime, at least not yet.  Further, neuroscience is 
insufficiently developed to detect specific, legally relevant mental content or to 
provide a sufficiently accurate diagnostic marker for even a severe mental 
disorder.46  Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural structure and function that bear 
on legally relevant capacities, such as the capacity for rationality and control, may 
be temporally stable in general or in individual cases.  If they are, neuroevidence 
may permit a reasonably valid retrospective inference about the defendant’s 
rational and control capacities and their impact on criminal behavior.  This will, 
of course, depend on the existence of adequate science to do this.  We currently 
lack such science,47 but future research may provide the necessary data.48 
Now let us consider the specific grounds for neuromodesty in cognitive, 
affective, and social neuroscience, the sub-disciplines most relevant to law.  At 
present, most neuroscience studies on human beings involve very small numbers 
of subjects, although this phenomenon is rapidly starting to change as the cost of 
scanning decreases.  Future studies will have more statistical power.  Most of the 
studies have been done on college and university students, who are hardly a 
random sample of the population generally and of criminal offenders specifically.  
There is also a serious question of whether findings based on subjects’ behavior 
 
46.  Stephen J. Morse & William T. Newsome, Criminal Responsibility, Criminal Competence, 
and Prediction of Criminal Behavior, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 150, 159–
60, 167 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013). 
47.  Id. at 166–67 (explaining generally that, except in the cases of a few well-characterized 
medical disorders such as epilepsy, current neuroscience has little to add to resolving questions of 
criminal responsibility). 
48.  In contrast, questions concerning various criminal competencies, such as competence to stand 
trial or to plead guilty, and predictions of future behavior are based on a subject’s present condition.  Thus, 
the problems besetting retrospective responsibility analysis do not apply to such issues.  The criteria for 
competence are functional.  They ask whether the subject can perform some task—such as understanding 
the nature of a criminal proceeding or understanding a treatment option that is offered—at a level the law 
considers normatively acceptable to warrant respecting the subject’s choice and autonomy.  Prediction 
questions simply ask about the probability of some particular future behavior’s occurring within some 
time frame, but the law’s criteria for predictions are typically framed as standards and thus allow room for 
normative judgment. 
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and brain activity in a scanner would apply to real-world situations.  This is 
known as the problem of “ecological validity.”  Does a subject’s performance in 
a laboratory on an executive function task in a scanner really predict the person’s 
ability to resist criminal offending?49  
Most studies average the neurodata over the subjects, and the average finding 
may not accurately describe the brain structure or function of any actual subject 
in the study.  Replications are few, which is especially important for law.  Policy 
and adjudication should not be influenced by findings that are insufficiently 
established, and replications of findings are crucial to our confidence in a result, 
especially given the problem of publication bias.  Finally, the neuroscience of 
cognition and interpersonal behavior is largely in its infancy and what is known 
is quite coarse-grained and correlational, rather than fine-grained and causal.50  
What is being investigated is an association between a condition or a task in the 
scanner and brain activity.  These studies do not demonstrate that the brain 
activity is a sensitive diagnostic marker for the condition or either a necessary, 
sufficient, or predisposing causal condition for the behavioral task that is being 
done in the scanner.  Any language that suggests otherwise—such as claiming 
that some brain region is the neural substrate for the behavior—is simply not 
justifiable based on the methodology of most studies.  Such inferences are only 
justified if everything else in the brain remained constant, which is seldom the 
case.51  Moreover, activity in the same region may be associated with 
diametrically opposite behavioral phenomena—for example, love and hate. 
There are also technical and research design difficulties.  It takes many 
mathematical transformations to get from the raw fMRI data to the images of the 
brain that are increasingly familiar.  Explaining these transformations is beyond 
me, but I do understand that the likelihood that an investigator will find a 
statistically significant result depends on how the researcher sets the threshold for 
significance.  There is dispute about this, and the threshold levels are 
conventional.  If the threshold changes, so does the outcome.  I have been 
 
49.  For example, the famous Stroop test asks subjects to state the color in which a color word is 
written, rather than simply to read the word itself.  Thus, if the word “red” is written in yellow, the 
correct answer is yellow.  We all have what is known as a strong prepotent response (a strong 
behavioral disposition) simply to read the word rather than to identify the color in which it is written.  
It takes a lot of inhibitory ability to refrain from the prepotent response.  But are people who do poorly 
on the Stroop more predisposed to commit violent crimes even if the associated brain activation is 
consistent with decreased prefrontal control in subjects?  We do not know.  And in any case, what 
legally relevant, extra information does the neuroscience add to the behavioral data with which it was 
correlated? 
50.  See, e.g., Gregory A. Miller, Mistreating Psychology in the Decades of the Brain, 5 PERSP. 
ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 716 (2010) (providing a cautious, thorough overview of the scientific and practical 
problems facing cognitive and social neuroscience). 
51.  Adolphs, supra note 18, at 173. 
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convinced by neuroscience colleagues that many such technical difficulties have 
largely been solved, but research design and potentially unjustified inferences 
from the studies are still an acute problem.  It is extraordinarily difficult to control 
for all conceivable artifacts.  Consequently, there are often problems of over-
inference.  
Neuroscience also shares with other sciences what is known as the G2i 
problem, which is how to make inferences about a particular individual based 
on group data.52  Scientists are interested in how the world works and produce 
general information.  Law is often concerned with individual cases, and it is 
difficult to know how properly to apply relevant group data.  For example, as 
noted, a neuroscience study that reports increased activation in some brain 
region of interest bases its conclusion on averaging the activation across all the 
subjects, but no subject’s brain may have activated precisely in the area 
identified.  If such group data are permitted, as they now are for functions such 
as predictions, the question is how to use probabilistic data to answer what is 
often a binary question.53  This is a topic under intensive investigation at 
present, and I assume progress will be made. 
Over time, all these problems identified may ease as imaging and other 
techniques become less expensive and more accurate, research designs become 
more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the science increases generally. 
How should the law respond when valid and relevant neuroevidence is 
inconsistent with the defendant’s behavior?  Recall that the criminal law’s criteria 
are all behavioral—actions and mental states.  Therefore, cases of malingering 
aside, actions speak louder than images.  This is a truism for all criminal 
responsibility.  If the finding of any test or measurement of behavior is 
contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must believe the real world 
behavioral evidence because it is more direct and probative of the law’s 
behavioral criteria.  For example, if the person behaves rationally in a wide 
variety of circumstances, the agent is rational even if the brain appears 
structurally or functionally abnormal.  We confidently knew that some people 
 
52.  See generally David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to 
Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014). 
53.  For an interesting current example of this problem in the context of the capital punishment 
proceeding for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the defendant convicted of the Boston Marathon bombings, see 
Sally Satel & Scott O. Lilienfeld, The “Immature Teen Brain” Defense and the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 
Trial, WASH. POST (May 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/the-immature-teen-brain-defense-and-the-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-trial/ 
[http://perma.cc/8F6J-W5K5], and Sally Satel & Scott O. Lilienfeld, Neuro-expert testifies for 
Tsarnaev, WASH. POST (May 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/05/11/neuro-expert-testifies-for-tsarnaev/ [http://perma.cc/VB4D-PVBP].  In the 
event, the jury was not swayed by the general neuroscientific data about the juvenile brain and 
sentenced Tsarnaev to death. 
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were behaviorally abnormal, such as being psychotic (grossly out of touch with 
reality), long before there were any psychological or neurological tests for such 
abnormalities.  
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive.  Suppose someone 
complains about back pain, a subjective symptom, and the question is whether 
the subject actually does have back pain.  We know that many people with 
abnormal spines do not experience back pain, and many people who complain of 
back pain have normal spines.  If the person is claiming a disability and the spine 
looks dreadful, evidence that the person regularly exercises on a trampoline 
without difficulty indicates that there is no disability caused by back pain.  If there 
is reason to suspect malingering, however, and there is not clear behavioral 
evidence of lack of pain, then a completely normal spine might be of use in 
deciding whether the claimant is malingering.  Unless the correlation between the 
image and the legally relevant behavior is very powerful, however, such evidence 
will be of limited help.  Further, although the neuroscience of pain is making 
advances,54 neuroscience cannot be used at present to diagnose mental disorder 
because scanning is insufficiently sensitive for these purposes.55 
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential contribution of 
neuroscience is large.  Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that neuroscience at 
present is not likely to be of much help.  I term the reason for this the “clear cut” 
problem.56  Virtually all neuroscience studies of potential interest to the law 
involve some behavior that has already been identified as of interest, and the point 
of the study is to identify that behavior’s neural correlates.  Neuroscientists do 
not go on general “fishing” expeditions.57  There is usually some bit of 
behavior—such as addiction, schizophrenia or impulsivity—that investigators 
would like to understand better by investigating its neural correlates.  To do this 
 
54.  Amanda C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Pain Neuroimaging Can Help 
Transform the Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1099 (forthcoming 2015). 
55.  Allen Frances, Whither DSM-V?, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 391 (2009).  Many studies do 
find differences between patients with mental disorders and controls, but the differences are too small 
to be used diagnostically.  See generally John P.A. Ioannidis, Excess Significance Bias in the Literature 
on Brain Volume Abnormalities, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 773 (2011) (claiming, based on a 
meta-analysis of studies of brain volume abnormalities in patients with mental disorders, that many 
more studies than should be expected found statistically significant results and that this can be best 
explained by bias in the reporting of the data). 
56.  Morse, supra note 6, at 540.   
57.  For an amusing exception, see Craig M. Bennett et al., Neural Correlates of Interspecies 
Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salmon: An Argument for Proper Multiple 
Comparisons Correction, 1 J. SERENDIPITOUS & UNEXPECTED RESULTS 1 (2009), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.161.8384&rep=rep1&type=pdf [http://per
ma.cc/VU7B-K5DJ].  The study scanned a dead Atlantic salmon to demonstrate that significant results 
can be obtained from the most unpromising investigation unless the research design properly controls 
for chance findings (false positives). 
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properly presupposes that the researchers have already well-characterized and 
validated the behavior under neuroscientific investigation.  Thus, neurodata can 
be no more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated.  In such cases, the 
neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified behaviors 
precisely because the behavior is so clear.  Less clear behavior is simply not 
studied, or the overlap in data about less clear behavior is greater between 
experimental and comparison subjects.  Thus, the neural markers of clear cases 
will provide little guidance to resolve behaviorally ambiguous cases of legally 
relevant behavior, and they are unnecessary if the behavior is sufficiently clear. 
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior is not well-
characterized or is neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly different 
behavior.  In general, however, the existence of legally relevant behavior will 
already be apparent before the neuroscientific investigation is begun.  For 
example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality.  If, as a result, they 
do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them because they lack such 
knowledge.  We might learn a great deal about the neural correlates of such 
psychological abnormalities.  But we already knew without neuroscientic data 
that these abnormalities existed, and we had a firm view of their normative 
significance.  In the future, however, we may learn more about the causal link 
between the brain and behavior, and studies may be devised that are more directly 
legally relevant.  I suspect that we are unlikely to make substantial progress with 
neural assessment of legally relevant mental content, but we are likely to learn 
more about capacities that will bear on excuse or mitigation. 
If actions speak louder than images and the clear cut problem exists, however, 
what room is there for introducing neuroevidence in legal cases?  Let us begin 
with cases in which the behavioral evidence is clear and permits an equally clear 
inference about the defendant’s mental state.  For example, lay people may not 
know the technical term to apply to people who are manifestly out of touch with 
reality, but they will readily recognize this unfortunate condition.  No further tests 
of any sort will be necessary to prove that the subject suffers from seriously 
impaired rationality.  In such cases, neuroevidence will be at most convergent and 
increase our confidence in what we already had confidently concluded.  
Determining if it is worth collecting the neuroevidence will depend on whether 
the cost-benefit analysis justifies obtaining convergent evidence. 
Roper v. Simmons is the most striking example of a case in which the 
behavioral evidence was clear.58  In Roper, the United States Supreme Court 
categorically excluded the death penalty for capital murderers who killed when 
they were sixteen or seventeen years old on the grounds that adolescents do not 
 
58.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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deserve the death penalty.59  The amicus briefs were replete with neuroscience 
data showing that the brains of late adolescents are not fully, biologically mature, 
and advocates used these data to suggest that adolescent killers could not be fairly 
put to death.60  Now, we already knew from commonsense observation and from 
rigorous behavioral studies that juveniles are on average less rational than adults.  
What could the neuroscientific evidence about the juvenile brain have added?  It 
was consistent with the undeniable behavioral data and perhaps provided a partial 
causal explanation of the behavioral differences.  The proffered neuroscience data 
were therefore merely additive and only indirectly relevant, and the Supreme 
Court did not cite these data, except perhaps by implication when it referred 
vaguely to “other” scientific evidence.61 
Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average than adults, to 
exclude them categorically from the death penalty is a normative legal question 
and not a scientific or psychological question.  Advocates claimed, however, that 
the neuroscience confirmed that adolescents are insufficiently responsible to be 
executed, thus confusing the positive and the normative.  The neuroscience 
evidence in no way independently confirms that adolescents are less responsible.  
If the behavioral differences between adolescents and adults were slight, it would 
not matter if their brains were quite different.  Similarly, if the behavioral 
differences were sufficient for moral and constitutional differential treatment, 
then it would not matter if the brains were essentially indistinguishable.  If the 
brains were indistinguishable, the most sensible inference would be that 
neuroscience is not yet sensitive enough to track the behavioral differences, not 
that we are mistaken about whether behavioral differences exist.  
For another example, suppose that in an insanity defense case the question is 
whether the defendant suffers from a major mental disorder such as 
schizophrenia.  In extreme cases, the behavior will be clear, and no neurodata will 
 
59.  Id. at 578–79. 
60.  E.g., Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633). 
61.  Id. at 569, 573.  The Supreme Court referred generally to other science, but it was not clear 
whether neuroscience played a specific role.  The Supreme Court did cite neuroscientific findings in 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77–82 (2010), which categorically excluded juveniles from life without 
the possibility of parole in non-homicide cases, and in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012), 
which held that the sentence of life without possibility of parole was constitutional for juveniles who 
committed homicide crimes but that it was unconstitutional to impose this penalty mandatorily.  In both 
cases, the citation was conclusory and generally non-specific, and I believe it was dictum.  The Supreme 
Court was responding in Graham to an argument that no party had seriously made, which was that the 
science of adolescent development had changed significantly since Roper was decided.  Also in Miller, 
the Court drew a distinction between social science and “science.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5.  Social 
science, like neuroscience, is science (and arguably more directly relevant to legal criteria for the reasons 
this Article has discussed).  The important distinctions are between good and bad science and legally 
relevant and legally irrelevant science. 
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be necessary.  Investigators have discovered various small, but statistically 
significant, differences in neural structure or function between people who are 
clearly suffering from schizophrenia and those who are not.62  Nonetheless in a 
behaviorally unclear case, the overlap between data on the brains of people with 
schizophrenia and people without the disorder is so great that a scan is 
insufficiently sensitive to be used for diagnostic purposes.  In short, at present in 
those cases in which the neuroscience would be most helpful, it has little to 
contribute.  Again, this situation may change if neural markers become more 
diagnostically sensitive for legally relevant criteria. 
Some people think that executive capacity—the congeries of cognitive and 
emotional capacities that help to plan and regulate human behavior—is going to 
be the Holy Grail to help the law determine an offender’s true culpability.  After 
all, there is an attractive moral case that people with a substantial lack of these 
capacities are less culpable, even if their conduct satisfied the prima facie case 
for the crime charged.  Perhaps neuroscience can provide specific data previously 
unavailable to identify executive capacity differences more precisely. 
There are two problems, however.  First, significant problems with executive 
capacity are readily apparent without testing, and criminal law simply will not 
adopt fine-grained culpability criteria.  Second, the correlation between 
neuropsychological tests of executive capacity and actual real world behavior is 
not terribly strong.63  Only a small fraction of the variance is accounted for, and 
the scanning studies will use the types of tasks the psychological tests use.  
Consequently, we are far from able to use neuroscience accurately to assess non-
obvious executive-capacity differences that are valid in real world contexts.  
VIII.THE RADICAL NEUROCHALLENGE: ARE WE VICTIMS OF NEURONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES? 
This part addresses the claim and hope raised earlier that neuroscience will 
cause a paradigm shift in criminal responsibility by demonstrating that we are 
“merely victims of neuronal circumstances” (or some similar claim that denies 
human agency).  This claim holds that we are not the kinds of intentional 
creatures we think we are.  If our mental states play no role in our behavior and 
are simply epiphenomenal, then traditional notions of responsibility based on 
mental states and on actions guided by mental states would be imperiled.  But is 
the rich explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply a post hoc rationalization 
 
62.  On the other hand, there may be reason to be cautious about such findings.  See generally 
Ioannidis, supra note 55.  
63.  See, e.g., Russell A. Barkley & Kevin R. Murphy, Impairment in Occupational Functioning 
and Adult ADHD: The Predictive Utility of Executive Function (EF) Ratings Versus EF Tests, 25 
ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 157 (2010). 
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that the brains of hapless homo sapiens construct to explain what their brains have 
already done?  Will the criminal justice system as we know it wither away as an 
outmoded relic of a prescientific and cruel age?  If so, criminal law is not the only 
area of law in peril.  What will be the fate of contracts, for example, when a 
biological machine that was formerly called a person claims that it should not be 
bound because it did not make a contract?  The contract is also simply the 
outcome of various “neuronal circumstances.” 
Before continuing, we must understand that the compatibilist metaphysics 
adopted in Part III does not save agency if the radical claim is true.  If determinism 
is true, two states of the world concerning agency are possible: agency exists or 
it does not.  Compatibilism assumes that agency is true because it holds that 
agents can be responsible in a determinist universe.  It thus essentially begs the 
question against the radical claim.  If the radical claim is true, then compatibilism 
is false because no responsibility is possible if we are not agents.  It is an 
incoherent notion to have genuine responsibility without agency.  The question is 
whether the radical claim is true. 
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-mind-action 
connections, to claim that we should radically change our conceptions of 
ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices based on neuroscience is a form 
of “neuroarrogance.”  Although I predict that we will see far more numerous 
attempts to introduce neuroevidence in the future, I have elsewhere argued that 
for conceptual and scientific reasons, there is no reason at present to believe that 
we are not agents.64  In particular, I can report that the “Libet industry” that 
overclaimed about the alleged moral and legal implications of neuroscientist 
Benjamin Libet’s findings appears to be bankrupt.  His work found that there 
was brain activity in the supplemental motor area prior to awareness of the urge 
to bodily movements and before movements occurred.  This work and the 
findings of other similar investigations led to the assertion that our brains do all 
the causal work in explaining behavior.  Recent conceptual and empirical work 
seems to have exploded these claims.65  In short, I doubt that this industry will 
emerge from whatever chapter of the bankruptcy code applies in such cases.  It 
is possible that we are not agents, but the current science does not remotely 
 
64.  Morse, supra note 6, at 543–54; Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk 
Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2008). 
65.  See, e.g., ALFRED R. MELE, EFFECTIVE INTENTIONS: THE POWER OF CONSCIOUS WILL 
(2009); ALFRED R. MELE, FREE: WHY SCIENCE HASN’T DISPROVED FREE WILL (2014); Moore, supra 
note 7; Parashkev Nachev & Peter Hacker, The Neural Antecedents to Voluntary Action: Response to 
Commentaries, 6 COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 180 (2015); Aaron Schurger et al., An Accumulator 
Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-Initiated Movement, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S. E2904, (2012); Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol, Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin 
of Voluntary Action, 2015 REV. PHIL. PSYCH. (ONLINE FIRST ARTICLE) 1, 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-014-0223-2 [http://perma.cc/7DJL-5BWZ]. 
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demonstrate that this is true.  The burden of persuasion is firmly on the 
proponents of the radical view. 
Most important, the radical view entails no positive agenda.  If the truth of 
pure mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do, no particular moral, legal, 
or political conclusions follow from it.66  The radical view provides no guide as 
to how one should live or how one should respond to the truth of reductive 
mechanism.  Normativity depends on reason, and thus the radical view is 
normatively inert.  Reasons are mental states.  If reasons do not matter, then we 
have no reason to adopt any particular morals, politics, or legal rules or to do 
anything at all.  
Suppose we are convinced by the mechanistic view that we are not 
intentional, rational agents after all.67  If it is really “true” that we do not have 
mental states or, slightly more plausibly, that our mental states are epiphenomenal 
and play no role in the causation of our actions, what should we do now?  If it is 
true, we know that it is an illusion to think that our deliberations and intentions 
have any causal efficacy in the world.  We also know, however, that we 
experience sensations—such as pleasure and pain—and care about what happens 
to us and to the world.  We cannot just sit quietly and wait for our brains to 
activate, for determinism to happen.  We must, and will, deliberate and act.  And 
if we do not act in accord with the “truth” that the radical view suggests, we 
cannot be blamed.  Our brains made us do it. 
Even if we still thought that the radical view was correct and standard notions 
of genuine moral responsibility and desert were therefore impossible, we might 
still believe that the law would not necessarily have to give up the concept of 
incentives.  Indeed, Greene and Cohen concede that we would have to keep 
punishing people for practical purposes.68  Such an account would be consistent 
with “black box” accounts of economic incentives that simply depend on the 
relation between inputs and outputs without considering the mind as a mediator 
between the two.  For those who believe that a thoroughly naturalized account of 
human behavior entails complete consequentialism, this conclusion might be 
welcomed. 
 
66.  This line of thought was first suggested by Professor Mitchell Berman in the context of a 
discussion of determinism and normativity.  Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 
ETHICS 258, 271 n.34 (2008). 
67.  Of course, the notion of being “convinced” would be an illusion, too.  Being convinced means 
that we are persuaded by evidence or argument, but a mechanism is not persuaded by anything.  A 
mechanism is simply neurophysically transformed. 
68.  Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 218.  The use of the word “punish” is a solecism in their 
account.  Punishment in criminal justice has a constitutive moral meaning associated with guilt and 
desert.  It is not simply a negative reinforcement.  They should more properly be talking simply in 
terms of positive and negative reinforcements. 
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On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal contradiction 
just explored.  What is the nature of the agent that is discovering the laws 
governing how incentives shape behavior?  Could understanding and providing 
incentives via social norms and legal rules simply be epiphenomenal 
interpretations of what the brain has already done?  How do we decide which 
behaviors to reinforce positively or negatively?  What role does reason—a 
property of thoughts and agents, not a property of brains—play in this decision? 
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly disappearing 
person remains fully visible and necessarily continues to act for good reasons, 
including the reasons currently to reject the radical view.  We are not Pinocchios, 
and our brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings.  And this is a very good 
thing.  Ultimately, I believe that the vision of the person, of interpersonal 
relations, and of society the radical view entails bleaches the soul.  In the 
concrete and practical world we live in, we must be guided by our values and a 
vision of the good life.  I do not want to live in the radical’s world that is stripped 
of genuine agency, desert, autonomy, and dignity.  For all its imperfections, the 
criminal law’s vision of the person and agency is more respectful and humane. 
IX. THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS NEUROLAW OPTIMISM 
Despite having claimed that we should be exceptionally cautious about the 
current contributions that neuroscience can make to criminal law policy, doctrine, 
and adjudication, I am modestly optimistic about the near and intermediate term 
contributions neuroscience can potentially make to our ordinary, traditional, folk-
psychological criminal law doctrine and practice.  In other words, neuroscience 
may make a positive contribution even though there has been no paradigm shift 
in thinking about the nature of the person and the criteria for criminal 
responsibility.  The legal regime to which neuroscience will contribute will 
continue to take people seriously as people—as autonomous agents who may 
fairly be blamed and punished based on their mental states and actions. 
In general, my hope is that over time there will be feedback between the folk-
psychological criteria and the neuroscientific data.  Each might inform the other.  
Conceptual work on mental states might suggest new neuroscientific studies, for 
example, and the neuroscientific studies might help refine the folk-psychological 
categories.  The ultimate goal would be a reflective, conceptual–empirical 
equilibrium.  At present, I think much of the most promising legally relevant 
research concerns areas other than criminal justice,69 but in what follows I will 
focus on criminal law. 
 
69.  E.g., objective identification of pain, which would transform tort and disability law.  See 
Pustilnik, supra note 55. 
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More specifically, there are four types of situations in which neuroscience 
may be of assistance: (1) data indicating that the folk-psychological assumption 
underlying a legal rule is incorrect; (2) data suggesting the need for new or 
reformed legal doctrine; (3) evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case; and 
(4) data that help efficient adjudication or administration of criminal justice. 
Many criminal law doctrines are based on folk-psychological assumptions 
about behavior that may prove to be incorrect.  If so, the doctrine should change.  
For example, it is commonly assumed that agents intend the natural and probable 
consequences of their actions.  In many or most cases it seems that they do, but 
neuroscience may help in the future to demonstrate that this assumption is true 
far less frequently than we think because, say, more apparent actions are 
automatic than is currently realized.70  In that case, the rebuttable presumption 
used to help the prosecution prove intent should be softened or used with more 
caution. 
Second, neuroscientific data may suggest the need for new or reformed legal 
doctrine.  For example, control tests for legal insanity have been disfavored for 
some decades because they are ill understood and hard to assess.  It is at present 
impossible to distinguish “cannot” from “will not,” which is one of the reasons 
both the American Bar Association and the American Psychiatric Association 
both recommended abolition of control tests for legal insanity in the wake of the 
unpopular Hinckley verdict.71  Perhaps neuroscientific information will help to 
demonstrate and to prove the existence of control difficulties that are independent 
of cognitive incapacities.72  If so, then independent control tests may be justified 
 
70.  How successfully such research can be accomplished is difficult to predict, especially if the 
folk wisdom concerns content rather than functions or capacities.  In the example given, a good 
working definition of automaticity would be necessary, and “experimental” subjects being scanned 
would have to be reliably in an automatic state.  This will be exceedingly difficult research to do.  Also, 
if the real world behavior and the neuroscience seem inconsistent, with rare exception the behavior 
would have to be considered the accurate measure.  Recall the example from Part VII concerning 
adolescence.  If neuroscience were not able to distinguish average adolescent from average adult 
brains, the sensible conclusions based on common sense and behavioral studies would be that 
adolescents on average behave less rationally and that the neuroscience is not yet sufficiently advanced 
to permit identification of neural differences. 
71.  ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 330, 339-42 (1989); American 
Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, reprinted in 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681 
(1983). 
72.  See Michael S. Moore, The Neuroscience of Volitional Excuse, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: 
STATE OF THE ART (Dennis Patterson ed., forthcoming 2016).  Moore makes the most thorough attempt 
to date to provide both the folk-psychological mechanism for loss of control and a neuroscientific 
agenda for studying it.  I believe, however, that the mechanism he describes is better understood as a 
cognitive rationality defect and that such defects are the true source of alleged “loss of control” cases 
that might warrant mitigation or excuse.  I address this claim more fully in Stephen J. Morse, Moore 
on the Mind, in LEGAL, MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. 
MOORE (Kimberly K. Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., forthcoming 2016). 
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and can be rationally assessed after all.  More generally, perhaps a larger 
percentage of offenders than we currently believe have such grave control 
difficulties that they deserve a generic mitigation claim that is not available in 
criminal law today.73  Neuroscience might help us discover that fact.  If that were 
true, justice would be served by adopting a generic mitigating doctrine.  On the 
other hand, if it turns out that such difficulties are not so common, we could be 
more confident of the justice of current doctrine. 
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate individual cases.  
Consider the insanity defense again.  As in United States v. Hinckley,74 there is 
often dispute about whether a defendant claiming legal insanity suffered from a 
mental disorder, which disorder the defendant suffered from, or how severe the 
disorder was.75  At present, these questions must be resolved entirely 
behaviorally, and there is often room for considerable disagreement about 
inferences drawn from the defendant’s actions, including utterances.  In the 
future, neuroscience might help resolve such questions if the clear-cut problem 
difficulty can be solved.  In the foreseeable future, I doubt that neuroscience will 
be able to help identify the presence or absence of specific mens rea because mind 
reading seems nearly impossible, but we may be able to identify brain states that 
suggest that a subject is lying or is familiar with a place he denies recognizing.76 
Finally, neuroscience might help us to implement current policy more 
efficiently.  For example, the criminal justice system makes predictions about 
future dangerous behavior for purposes of bail, sentencing (including capital 
sentencing), and parole.  If we have already decided that it is justified to use 
dangerousness predictions to make such decisions, it is hard to imagine a rational 
argument for doing it less accurately if we are in fact able to do it more 
accurately.77  Behavioral prediction techniques already exist.  The question is 
whether neuroscientific variables can add value by increasing the accuracy of 
such predictions considering the cost of gathering such data.  Very recently, two 
 
73.  I have proposed a generic mitigating condition that would address both cognitive and control 
incapacities short of those warranting a full excuse.  Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, 
Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003). 
74.  525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981). 
75.  Id. at 1346. 
76.  Henry T. Greely, Mind Reading, Neuroscience, and the Law, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL 
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 46, at 120.  This is known as “brain reading” because it identifies 
neural correlates of a mental process rather than the subject’s specific mental content.  The latter would 
be “mind reading.”  For example, particular brain activation might reliably indicate whether the subject 
was adding or subtracting, but it could not show what specific numbers were being added or subtracted.  
John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 
(2007). 
77.  2 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY MATTERS: 
TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 98 (2015) (approvingly 
quoting this position of mine). 
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studies have been published showing the potential usefulness of neural markers 
for enhancing the accuracy of predictions of antisocial conduct.78  Although these 
must be considered preliminary, “proof of concept” studies,79 it is perfectly 
plausible that in the future genuinely valid, cost–benefit, justified neural markers 
will be identified and, thus, prediction decisions will be more accurate and just. 
X. CONCLUSION 
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just and accurate 
criminal law policy, doctrine, and individual case adjudication.  This was the 
conclusion reached when I tentatively identified “Brain Overclaim Syndrome” 
nine years ago, and it remains true today.  In the future, however, as the 
philosophies of mind and action and neuroscience mutually mature and inform 
one another, neuroscience will help us understand criminal behavior.  Although 
no radical transformation of criminal justice is likely to occur, neuroscience can 
inform criminal justice as long as it is relevant to law and translated into the law’s 
folk-psychological framework and criteria.  The home remedies are working, and 
please don’t wake me until the doctor comes.  As Jerry Fodor counseled, 
“[E]verything is going to be all right.”80 
 
 
78.  Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
6223 (2013); Dustin A. Pardini et al., Lower Amygdala Volume in Men Is Associated with Childhood 
Aggression, Early Psychopathic Traits, and Future Violence, 75 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 73 (2014). 
79.  For example, a re-analysis of the Aharoni study by Russell Poldrack, a noted 
“neuromethodologist,” demonstrated that the effect size was tiny.  Russell Poldrack, How Well Can 
We Predict Future Criminal Acts from fMRI Data?, RUSSPOLDRACK.ORG (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.russpoldrack.org/search?q=aharoni [http://perma.cc/X5TP-LGZ8].  Also, the study used 
good, but not the best, behavioral predictive methods for comparison. 
80.  FODOR, supra note 5, at xii. 
